A core goal of regulators and financial authorities is to understand how market prices convey information on the financial health of its participants. From this viewpoint we build an Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS) that allows for identifying those financial institutions perceived as risky counterparts by the participants of the interbank market. We use micro-level data from bilateral overnight unsecured loans performed in the interbank market between January 2011 and December 2014. The EWIS identifies those participants that systematically pay high prices for liquidity in this market. We employ coverage tests to estimate EWIS' robustness and consistency. We find that financial institutions with an elevated frequency of signals tend to exhibit a net borrower liquidity position in the interbank market, hence suggesting they are facing recurrent liquidity needs. Those institutions also exhibit higher probability of insolvency measured by the Z-score indicator. Thus, our results support the existence of market discipline based on peer-monitoring. Overall, the EWIS may assist financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources on those financial institutions perceived by the market as those closer to distress. JEL codes: E40; G14; G21 Keywords: Early warning indicators, interbank markets, market discipline, bank risk.
Introduction
The interbank funds market is one of the main sources of short-term funding among financial institutions world-wide. In spite of most of the interbank operations are overnight or with a very short maturity (2-5 days) counterparty risk plays a major role given that there is no collateral pledged to the loan. Thus, private information on the creditworthiness of interbank participants has been found to be one of the main determinants of the premium charged on interbank loans (Braüning and Fecht, 2012) . In normal times the interbank market tends to be a stable source of liquidity, and its participants usually trade funds at rates close to the central bank's policy rate. However, during periods of stress interbank market' participants tend to hoard liquidity, and to lend funds at higher prices because of their concerns on counterparty risk -as evidenced during the global financial crisis (see Afonso, et al 2011; Acharya and Merrouche (2012) ).
1 Thus, identifying the behavior of financial institutions and examining disruptions in the interbank market has been a recent concern for central banks and regulators.
From a micro-prudential perspective, a core goal of regulators and financial authorities has been to understand how the market prices convey information on the financial health of its participants. The economic intuition is that when banks are taking too much risk and their creditors can identify those risky banks they tend to demand a higher return on the resources invested in the bank (Flannery, 2001 ). Hence, a higher risk premium will be observed in the prices that banks are paying for these instruments in the market (i.e. deposits or CDS) which have been used to estimate their default probability (See, ChanLau, 2006; Allen et. al, 2011) . Accordingly, financial authorities may prioritize and focus their efforts on those financial institutions whose market signals reveal that their peers consider them as more risky. Therefore, market discipline has been recently considered as a key tool to complement financial supervision and regulation, and to enhance financial stability (Plosser, 2014; Yellen, 2015) .
Recent evidence shows that banks tend to be good at monitoring their interbank market peers. The seminal work of Furfine (2001) employs interbank interest rates to observe market discipline among participants of the federal funds interbank market. He finds that the interest rate charged on those transactions reflects the credit risk of the borrowing bank. Banks with higher profitability, higher capital ratios, and fewer nonperforming loans are found to pay lower interest rates on federal funds loans. Thus, banks seem to be able to identify risk in their peers and -hence-to effectively monitor each other. Recently, the analytical framework of Furfine (2001) has been extended to incorporate other banks' characteristics. Evidence for European banks shows that banks tend to charge higher prices in unsecured interbank loans to counterparts with higher credit risk, more unbalanced liquidity needs, and fewer access to international markets (Cocco et. al, 2009; Angelini et. al, 2011; Fecht et. al, 2011) .
Following this branch of literature we propose an Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS) based on observed borrowing interest rates charged among interbank participants. We hypothesize that those financial institutions that are willing to pay higher borrowing rates are either facing liquidity risk or being penalized by their counterparts because of their credit risk (as in King, 2008; Heider and Hoerova, 2009; Ashcraft et. al, 2011) . Therefore, concurrent with market discipline literature, we examine whether market data allows for identifying "risky" financial institutions, as perceived and priced by their peers in the market.
We use micro-level data from overnight unsecured operations among financial institutions operating in the Colombian interbank market. Our sample comprises non-publicly available data on daily overnight bilateral unsecured transactions among 53 financial institutions from January 2011 to December 2014. The sample is consists of 24,856 overnight interbank loans observed during 974 effective days of operation. We employ conditional, independence and unconditional coverage tests proposed by Christoffersen, (2003) to confirm the robustness of the observed signals. In particular, we test if the share of daily signals over the total number of days of operation is statistically different from a given threshold and if those signals were observed in a recurrent basis (i.e. following days) in a given period. Hence, the EWIS captures those financial institutions that systematically pay high prices for their liquidity in the interbank market.
Results show that some institutions consistently pay high rates for their liquidity in the interbank market. In particular, we find that some participants pay high rates for more than 5 following days and even for more than 20 following days in a period of 60 days of operation. This result suggests that those institutions are exhibiting recurrent liquidity shortages, and that when they borrow liquidity from their counterparts they tend to be charged with high rates (as in Abassi, et. al, 2013 ).
An interesting result is that institutions that consistently display frequent and statistically significant signals also tend to exhibit a net borrower position in the interbank market, which suggests that they are facing recurrent liquidity needs. Moreover, we find that those institutions also exhibit a lower Z-score which points out that they have a higher probability of becoming insolvent (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) . Consequently, the EWIS provides evidence on market discipline in the interbank market as risky institutions are found to pay more for their short-term liquidity. Therefore, the EWIS may be a tool to assist financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources on those financial institutions perceived by the market as closer to enter into distress.
The Colombian Interbank Market
The Colombian interbank funds market is the unsecured market for liquidity. This is of a bilateral (i.e. over-the-counter) nature, in which participants impose counterparty limits among them based on their credit risk assessments. Despite the interbank market is open to all types of financial institutions, only a handful of large credit institutions use it in a consistent manner (see Martínez and León (2015) ). The rationality of this behavior can be explained by the under-provision of liquidity cross-insurance in interbank markets (see Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013) ).
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In Table 1 we can observe that the interbank rate (TIB) exhibits a similar volatility to the central bank intervention rate (i.e. standard deviation of .72 and .75, respectively) and the mean difference between the two rates is only 1 bps during the period. The mean daily amount traded in the interbank market during the period was COP $493 billion with a maximum of COP $1.348 billion in a day observed in March of 2013. [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . a Overnight weighted average rates for the interbank market (TIB) and the central bank repo rate (CB), differences between TIB and CB rates are in basis points (bps).
b Daily mean volume negotiated in the interbank market on an overnight maturity. Figure 1 depicts the trend of the interbank rate compared with the central bank rate during the 2011-2014 period. It is observed that the interbank rate closely follows the central banks rate (CB); this is expected because the interbank rate is the target rate for the implementation of the monetary policy of the central bank (see evidence in Cardozo et al., 2011; González et al., 2013) . However, we also observe some periods in which the interbank rate exceeds the central bank rate, especially during the tightening of the monetary policy in 2011and 2014. We also observe that the volume of interbank loans 2 However, as reported by León et al. (2014) , a hierarchical architecture similar to a core-periphery structure in which some large credit act as money-center institutions or super-spreaders of the central bank liquidity. Such architecture may alleviate inefficiencies from liquidity cross-underinsurance. See also Cepera et. al. (2013) for an evaluation of the role of lending relationships in the Colombian interbank market. varies greatly during the period (right axis) reflecting the liquidity shocks that banks usually face 3 . 
Interbank rate volatility
We employ three alternative benchmarks to analyze the interbank rate volatility by using the intraday rates, daily rates and 5-day rates. This approach allows us to identify structural changes in the dispersion of the interest rates in order to identify the high prices of liquidity paid by the participants of the interbank market. Table 2 describes the main statistics of the interbank rate under the three alternative measures. It is observed that the mean values tend to be very close under the three measures of the interest rate. As expected, intra-day volatility tends to be higher than both 5-day and daily volatility. 6,00 Table 2 . Summary statistics of the overnight interest rates in the interbank market. Intra-day stands for the interest rates during the day. Daily corresponds to the average weighted interest rate of each day. 5-day corresponds to the 5-day moving average of the interest rate.
In order to examine the evolution of the interbank rate volatility during the period we visualize the deviations of observed interbank interest rates charged between financial institutions from the three selected measures of volatility. In Figure 2 (panel I) we compare the deviations of the observed rates standardized with the standard deviation estimated on the entire period. This approach allows identifying structural changes in the dispersion of the interest rates. Visual inspection reveals that there are operations that are priced above the rest, especially since October 2011. This already suggests that some participants are charged with interest rates well above the mean rates in the interbank market (i.e. the blue bars located above the green bars in Figure 2 , panel I).
In Figure 2 (panel II and III) we compare the deviations of the observed rates standardized with intraday and 5-day volatility, respectively. Under this approach rates' dispersion is higher than that observed when standardizing with the entire period's standard deviation. Likewise, the presence of participants charged with interest rates well above the mean rates is more evident: the dispersion of observed interest rates reaches 5-standard deviation with ease. If those prices correspond to specific participants and are observed in a recurrent basis, we can argue that they are exhibiting recurrent liquidity needs because of a higher risk-taking in other markets (i.e. deposits or credit markets). Thus, private information on the risk-taking of those financial institutions will be reflected in their prices for liquidity loans (as in Furfine, 2001; Cocco et. al, 2009 ).
Therefore, this result could be indicating that some participants have been consistently charged with higher rates evidencing peer monitoring among interbank participants. Further, the 5-day volatility seems to account for the recent behavior of the market while smooth out the intra-day volatility. In the next section we consider the 5-day volatility as our preferred measure to compare the high prices for liquidity. Nevertheless, as a robustness of our results, we also compute the prices by using the other two measures of volatility. 
Methodology
We propose a EWIS that is intended to identify those financial institutions paying higher prices for their liquidity in the interbank market. The proposed methodology has two stages. Firstly, we compare individual and market weighted average interest rates. Then, we define some thresholds for "high" interest rates based on the standard deviation of interbank rates during the last 5 days of operations. Afterwards, we compute the signals for each participant of the interbank market as those exceeding those thresholds. Secondly, we perform unconditional, independence and conditional tests to gauge the robustness of the signals; these tests allow identifying the signals that are statistically different from a given threshold and that also tend to be recurrent during a given period.
The Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS)
We are interested in identifying those operations that are systematically traded at high prices among participants of the interbank market. For the identification strategy we compute the weighted average interest rate of overnight loans per day for each financial institution and compare it against the overnight (market-wide) interest rate plus a spread based on the recent (i.e. 5-day) market volatility.
Formally, in equation (1) the interest rate for a financial institution i is computed as the volume-weighted average of the borrowing interest rates (r it ) of all overnight loans (l it ) per day. That is the weighted average interest rate:
Then, in (2) we define the market interest rate as the sum of the weighted average interest rate for all financial institution j that borrow overnight liquidity in the interbank market at day t i.e. the average overnight (market-wide) interest rate:
We define three warning levels based on the number of standard deviations at which financial institutions' rates are contracted. We use the mean standard deviation of the previous 5 days of the market rate ( −5 ) as a benchmark to compare with the observed interest rate of each institution for every day t. As we mentioned before, we choose the 5-day volatility because it accounts for the recent behavior of the market. In addition, our minimum threshold for a significant signal of a frequent borrowing cost ranges from 5 to 20 days. Hence, we are using a volatility measure that is consistent with our time framework analysis.
The three warning levels or signals are defined in conditions (3) to (5). We set the warning level I in (3) for those institutions with average borrowing interest rates above the market interest rate plus 1.0 and below 1.5 times −5 . Accordingly, in condition (4) the level II accounts for those with average interest rates greater than the market interest rate plus 1.5 and below 2.0 times −5 . Finally, in (5) average interest rates greater than the market interest rate plus 2.0 times −5 are located in warning level III:
We set those different warning levels in order to assess to what extent financial institutions are paying higher prices for liquidity in the interbank market, and to be able to discriminate among them. The key element for this identification strategy is to disentangle if those high prices for liquidity correspond to a few institutions (counterparty risk) or to several institutions (aggregated liquidity risk). If the latter result is observed we may infer that high prices are reflecting market sentiment rather than credit rationing for individual counterparty risk (Iori et. al, 2012) .
Results
We compute the overnight average interest rate for each institution as in (1) and the market rate as in (2), then, we classify the rates within the three warning levels by using the conditions defined in (3) to (5). The sample comprises 10.589 observations for 974 days from January 2011 to December 2014. Note that an observation is defined as the average weighted borrowing rate of all the loans that a participant received in a given day t. In order to test for robustness we also compute the signals by using the other two measures of volatility. This strategy allows us to observe how sensitive the signals are when we use different measures of volatility. Table 3 shows the number of signals by using the three different volatility measures. We observe that the number of signals is greater under the 5-day volatility than when we employ the intra-day and daily volatility measures. This result is due to the 5-day volatility being lower (less volatile) than the other two measures (as reported in Table 2 ), which is because of it accounts for the recent history of the market and smooth the impact of the intraday behavior of the interest rates.
As expected, the lower the volatility the higher the signals exhibited. The number of signals as a proportion of the number of operations is the same when we employ the intraday and 5-day volatility measures (11%); whilst it is greater when we compute the signals under the daily standard deviation for the full period (16%). Table 3 . Frequency of EWIS for the interbank market under alternative measures of volatility (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . Daily corresponds to the standard deviation during the full period. Intra-day volatility is the standard deviation for each day. 5-day volatility is the moving average of the standard deviation during the previous 5 days.
Figure 3 depicts the observed interest rates classified under the three warning levels (signals) and includes the interbank market rate (computed as in (2)) and the central bank rate in order to identify how large the spread of those operations is. As expected, most of interbank operations (green dots) were agreed at rates close to the central bank rate, below +1.0 5-day standard deviation from the market rate. As reported in Table 2 , the average gap between interbank and the central bank rates was 1 bps, and the standard deviation was 2 bps. This result is in line with evidence from other interbank markets as they are the target market for the implementation of the monetary (see, BIS (2009) and Friedman and Kuttner (2011) ).
Interestingly, when we compare individual rates in the warning levels we find that there is a sizeable set of operations traded at particularly high rates (i.e. level III, in red dots) during most of the studied period. In fact, the number of signals located in level I (yellow dots) and II (orange dots) is lower than those observed in level III (as reported in Table 3 ). If those loans located in the warning level III correspond to a few institutions, we may infer that interbank participants are punishing those institutions in the market via high prices incorporated in the liquidity they lend to them. On the contrary, if those signals correspond to several participants we may infer that there is high volatility affecting the prices for liquidity or aggregated liquidity risk (as in Iori, et. al, 2012) . [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . This figure depicts daily frequency of EWIS for the interbank market, between 2011 and 2014, along with the market rate (TIB) and the central bank repo rate (CB). The green dots are those participants with rates below the market rate plus 1.0 standard deviation (i.e. observations with no signal). The yellow, orange and red dots correspond to those daily operations with rates between 1.0 and 1.5, between 1.5 and 2.0, and more than 2.0 times the 5-day volatility from the market interest rate, respectively.
In It is rather surprising that the number of level III signals exceeds those of level I and II. Our initial guess is that interbank interest rates distribute as a typical continuous distribution, with the frequency of observations monotonically decreasing in a smooth manner as they depart from the mean. However, if level III are more numerous than level I and II this may signal that the distribution of interest rates is not continuous. Figure 4 displays the distribution of interbank interest rates. We calculated the spread of each financial institution's interest rate with respect to the interbank average interest rate (TIB), classify them by their standardized difference with respect to TIB (i.e. no signal, level I, level II, level III), and plotted their frequency distribution. It is rather evident the non-continuity of the overall distribution, with level III describing some sort of different distribution. This is related with the fact that 63% of all the signals during the period were located al level III confirming the bimodal distribution of the signals we found.
It is arguable that the entire distribution may be bimodal, in which two different types of participants coexist: a set of financial institutions able to borrow at rates close to the average interest rate (e.g. no signal and low level signal), and a set able to borrow at rates that consistently exceed the average interest rate (i.e. level III signal). Thus, the EWIS seems able to capture those financial institutions paying higher prices. But the key element is to identify who are those institutions, and to determine if those high prices were recurrent for a well-defined set of financial institutions, or if they correspond to particular episodes along the assessed period that indistinctly affected all financial institutions. 
Identifying the riskier participants of the interbank market
In the previous section we found that some institutions paid high prices for their liquidity in the interbank market. Moreover, visual inspection of the distribution of interest rates (Figure 3 ) even advocates for the existence of two distinct sets of financial institutions, each accessing a different level of price for liquidity. Now, we want to identify who are those institutions and if paying high prices tend to be a recurrent behavior in the market.
In this sense, EWIS is useful to the extent that it can alert financial authorities of anomalies within financial institutions operating in the market. Thus, we are interested in identifying those financial institutions that exhibited an important proportion of signals in the interbank market. In particular, we want to know if the share of signals is statistically significant from a given threshold and to identify those participants exhibiting this behavior in a recurrent basis. The unconditional, independence and conditional tests proposed by Christoffersen (2003) allow us to incorporate these properties for the EWIS 4 .
Unconditional coverage testing
We are interested in identifying those financial institutions that exhibit an important number of signals in the interbank market. Thus, the first test compares the proportion of observed signals by each financial institution with respect to an admissible threshold. We want to test if the fraction of signals exhibited by a participant is significantly different from a given threshold. This is known as an unconditional coverage test.
Formally, we define a threshold, α, that is the proportion of signals from the total number of observations T in the period. The signals are those defined in conditions (3) to (5) in section 3.2. Overall, we hypothesize that if participants of the interbank market are good at monitoring their peers they should tend to exert market discipline by charging those counterparts with less probability of repayment with higher prices for liquidity (as in Cocco et. al, 2009; King, 2008; Angelini et. al, 2009 
In (6), if a participant registers a signal it takes the value of 1 in the sequence H t . Thus, H t=1 is the sequence across T days indicating when past violations occurred (i.e. when signals are observed in each institution). The total number of days with signal is given by T 1 , while the total number of days free from signal is T 0. Using observed data (Table 4) , we can easily estimate π from the ratio between the number of days with signals and the total number of observations; that is, π* = T 1 / T. Plugging the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates in the likelihood function (6) gives the optimized likelihood as:
Hence, in case we reject the null hypothesis that π = α, we are checking that the assessed institution exhibits a fraction of signals that is statistically greater than the threshold α.
Independence testing
We employ the independence testing for identifying those institutions presenting signals that are no independent; that is, signals that tend to be persistent over time. Thus, we can identify those participants of the interbank market that tend to pay higher prices recurrently.
To do this, we can employ a Markov sequence with transition probability matrix that relates our signals (H t=0 and H t=1 ) as dependent over time:
These transition probabilities simply mean that conditional on today being a state with no signal (H t=0 ), then the probability of tomorrow being a state with signal (H t=1 ) is given by π 01. The probability of tomorrow being a state with signal (H t=1 ) given today is also a state with signal (H t=1 ) is given by π 11. As only two outcomes are possible (zero and one), the two probabilities π 01 and π 11 describe the entire process. The probability of a non-signal state (H t=0 ) following a non-signal state (H t=0 ) is given by 1 -π 01 , and the probability of a non-signal state (H t=0 ) following a signal state (H t=1 ) is 1-π 11.
If we have a sample of T observations, then we can write the likelihood function of the first-order Markov process as (See, Christoffersen, 2003) :
Thus, we can check the independence hypothesis that π 01 = π 11 using the likelihood ratio test:
Where L(π*) is the likelihood under the alternative hypothesis form the LR uc test in (7). If we reject the null hypothesis for a particular institution it is possible to argue that it exhibits signals that are not independent among them. In other words, is safe to say that this institution registers signals than tend to be recurrent (i.e. to cluster) over time. This is an important characteristic of the signals because we are interested in identifying riskier institutions in the interbank market based on the prices they paid in the market, and on the recurrence those prices are charged with.
Conditional coverage testing
Ultimately, we care about simultaneously testing if the number of signals is above the threshold, and if they signals are independent. Thus, we can identify those institutions that simultaneously pay high prices in a recurrent fashion. For this type of evaluation we can employ the conditional coverage test proposed by Christoffersen, (2003) , which jointly checks for independence and correct coverage:
The test in (11) corresponds to testing that π 01 = π 11 = α. Notice that the LR cc test takes the likelihood from the null hypothesis in the LR uc and combines it with the likelihood from the alternative hypothesis in the LR ind test 5 .
Estimating the statistical significance of the signals
To implement the abovementioned tests we need to define the period of evaluation (T) and the threshold of admissible signals (α). These are crucial elements of the tests for the accurate identification of those institutions that may be considered as riskier. From equations (1) to (5) we obtain the days with signal (T 1 ) and free from signal (T 0 ) for each participant during the period. We need to define the number of days for the test (T) in order to compute the fraction of days with signals (π* = T 1 /T.) The unconditional test (LR uc ) defined in (7) requires choosing a threshold α, which is the proportion of signals we consider as "normal" during a given period of time. Because of we are using daily observations on overnight loans in the interbank market the signals are expressed as the number of days an institution pays a high price for its overnight liquidity. Thus, α represents a number of admissible days a participant of the market pays a high price for its liquidity.
In order to incorporate the recent behavior of the markets we test the signals in a quarterly basis. The test on quarterly samples usually accounts for 60 days of operation (T = 60). In this sample a participant with more than α days exhibiting signals will be identified by the test. For robustness we select different thresholds, 20, 10 and 5 days, which corresponds to levels of α equal to 0.33, .016 and 0.08, respectively, for periods of 60 days. This means that a participant with more than 5 days paying a high price (i.e. with signals) in a period of 60 days will be identified as risky. By using more thresholds we can check how robust our results are under alternative specifications.
As argued, the frequency in which the signals are observed is also relevant in this analysis. For instance, an institution exhibiting 10 signals along a 60-days period is different (i.e. less risky) from one who exhibits 10 signals in 10 days of the period of 60 days. Under both scenarios the LR uc test will identify these institutions given that the proportion of signals is greater that the threshold of five days i.e. π* > α 5 . But clearly, the latter participant entails a more risky behavior than the former. Therefore, to account for this type of behavior in the identification of the institutions we apply the independence test (LR ind ) presented in (10). This test allows us to identify if an institution exhibits recurrent signals during the period 6 .
Applying both tests simultaneously (as in (11)) will result in that only those institutions with a significant amount of recurrent signals will be identified as part of the ranking of risky institutions.
As with any statistical test we need to choose a significance level. The significance level depends on whether the number of observations and violations are relevant in the sample. We have 10,589 observations (T) and 1,161 signals (T 1 ) so we have 11% of the sample observations to test for, which brings us an appropriated set of observations and violations of these types of tests. We choose a significance level of 10% for the tests, which entails a critical value of 2.7055 from the χ 2 distribution.
Results on coverage testing
We apply unconditional, independence and conditional tests under the thresholds of 5, 10 and 20 days (i.e. α 5 , α 10 and α 20 ) to gauge the robustness of our results under different thresholds. To compare the results we rank the participants by the share of signals registered during the full period. We present for each of them the number of signals by level and the quarters with signals above each of the selected thresholds.
In Table 5 we present the 10 institutions with a share of signals greater than 1% during the period. We rank the participants by the share of signals, which is the quantity of signals over the total number of operations (π* = T 1 /T). We observe that 10 institutions accounted for 80% of the total signals presented during the period (927), and they also account for 33% of the operations in the interbank market. For these 10 institutions most of the signals were located at level III, followed by level II and level I, accounting for 91%, 75%, and 57% of the total signals, respectively.
We find that 7 of these 10 institutions registered at least one quarter with signals for more than 5 days, which were also recurrent (i.e. signals following signals). It means that for these 7 institutions we find statistically significant signals under the conditional and independence tests for the α 5 threshold. As expected, institutions with a greater share of signals tend to exhibit more periods of warning (i.e. quarters with statistically significance signals). Under the 10-days threshold (α 10 ) six participants registered quarters with recurrent signals, whereas under the 20-days threshold (α 20 ) only three of them (FI101, FI99 and FI100). These three institutions, FI101, FI99, and FI100, have a statistically significant amount of signals. Moreover, for several quarters more than one third of the days in which they borrow liquidity from the market they were charged with high rates (i.e. signals greater than the α 20 threshold). The share of signals for these institutions was 98%, 93%, and 47%, respectively; this suggests that these participants consistently paid high prices for their liquidity in the interbank market. In addition, those prices were mainly located at the level III of warning, indicating a larger premium charged from their counterparts. Figure 5 presents the evolution of the observed prices and signals for the above-mentioned financial institutions. We can observe that paying higher prices for liquidity was a frequent behavior for these financial institutions. The fact that the signals were consistently observed for these participants suggests that regulators should closely monitor their behavior in the market. To complement our results we present some characteristics of these participants in the next section. (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . This figure depicts daily frequency of EWIS in the interbank market for institutions FI_99, FI_101 and FI_100, between 2011 and 2014 , along with the market rate (TIB). The green dots are those operations with rates below the market rate plus 1.0 standard deviation (i.e. observations with no signal). The yellow, orange and red dots correspond to those operations with rates between 1.0 and 1.5, between 1.5 and 2.0, and more than 2.0 times the 5-day volatility from the market interest rate, respectively. Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Jul-12 Oct-12 Jan-13 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-13 Jan-14 No signal Level I Level II Level III TIB rate FI_101 FI_100 FI_99
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Insolvency risk, liquidity position and the EWIS
In this section we present some features of the participants identified with higher frequency of signals. For each institution in the top ten of the signals we compute the average spread over the interbank rate and the average net position in the interbank market during the period. These variables help us to understand how large the price of liquidly is for these institutions compared with their peers in the interbank market, and if they have recurrent liquidity needs that force them to pay those high prices. In particular, participants with frequent net borrower position may exhibit unbalanced liquidity positions, or they may tend to rely more on wholesale funding to operate. This behavior has been associated with bank fragility (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).
Our measure of insolvency risk is the Z-score indicator, which corresponds to the inverse probability of insolvency (Roy, 1952; Altman, 1968) . This indicator has been broadly used in the banking literature as a measure of the distance-to-insolvency, which is able to capture the risk-taking behavior of a financial institution (Tabak, et. al, 2012) 7 . The Z-score is defined as the number of standard deviations that an institution's rate of return on assets (ROA) has to fall for the institution to become insolvent. Formally, the Z-score is constructed as the sum of the mean rate of return on assets (μ roa ) and the mean equity-toassets ratio (car) divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets: z-score t = (μ roa + car t ) / σ roa .
There are several ways to compute this indicator. We use the approach of Lepetit and Strobel (2013) , in which the mean and standard deviation estimates, μ roa and σ roa , are calculated over the full sample [1 … T] , and combine these with current t values of the equity ratio (car t ). We compute the Z-score by using monthly balance-sheet information for all the participants of the interbank market during the period 2011-2014. We find a negative correlation between the share of signals and the Z-score with a slope of -0.24 ( Figure 6 ). This result indicates that a larger proportion of signals can be associated with a greater probability of insolvency (i.e lower Z-score). Table 6 depicts the liquidity position in the interbank market and the insolvency risk (Zscore) for the top ten participants with higher share of signals in the interbank market. We observe that these participants registered on average a net borrower position, indicating that they may are using this market as a recurrent source of funding, which can be risky, especially for commercial banks given that they are expected to rely more on deposits than on wholesale funding.
7 The Z-score measure was initially proposed by Roy (1952) who shown that the probability that current losses would exceed capital is less than or equal to 1/z 2 , so that higher level of z implies lower upper bound of insolvency probability. Altman (1968) tested the Z-score for the corporate sector. After that the Z-score was tested for the banking industry by Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et. al. (1993) . Since then many studies have been using the Z-score as a measure of bank's risk-taking (see Laeven and Levine (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) , Houston et al. (2010) , and Bertay et al. (2013) , among others). to the inverse probability of insolvency, the lower its value the larger the probability of insolvency. These institutions also tend to exhibit a positive spread over the interbank market rate. On average, the spread paid by these institutions was 20 bps, which exceeds the mean spread paid for all the participants in this market (i.e. 3 bps). Thus, we find evidence that the participants exhibiting the higher frequency of signals are consistently net borrowers in the interbank market, which may reflect recurrent liquidity needs. This result coincides with Fecht et al. (2011) in the sense that those institutions with higher liquidity needs are found to pay higher prices for their liquidity.
Regarding Z-score, we find that the ten participants with higher share of signals also tend to exhibit lower levels of Z-score (.213) compared with the mean level of all the participants (.339) indicating a higher risk-taking in those institutions compared with the rest of participants. For this group of participants insolvency risk is higher, and it can be associated with the higher price for liquidity they pay in the market. This evidence supports the role of lenders' private information in the interbank market (see Braüning and Fecht (2012) , Cocco et al. (2009) ).
As we mentioned before, we identify three interesting cases in the interbank market (institutions FI99, FI101, and FI100), with statistically significant signals under the α 20 threshold. These institutions have several characteristics in common. On average they paid a spread over the interbank market rate of 37 bps, 23 bps, and 63 bps, respectively, and also exhibited a borrower net position in this market. The Z-score for these institutions was .023, .027 and .145 which means that they faced a reduction in their financial robustness during this period. These levels of the Z-score are below the mean level of the top ten riskier participants (.213). Therefore, we may point out that these institutions' diminished robustness overlaps with their counterparts consistently charging them with high prices for liquidity. It is worth noting that the contribution of those financial institutions to the total assets of the 54 participating institutions is less than 0.02%.
Final remarks
We propose an EWIS that is able to identify those participants of the interbank market who consistently pay high prices for their liquidity. We assess to what extent financial institutions are paying higher prices for liquidity in the interbank market. As a few institutions with particular features are those which pay high prices for liquidity in a consistent manner, we find that credit rationing for individual counterparty risk is the main factor behind our results.
We confirm that a high frequency of signals is associated with a net borrowing position in the interbank market, and with a high probability of insolvency. In our case, institutions with high frequency of signals experienced episodes of diminished financial robustness as well, but their contribution to financial systems' assets is rather low. Thus, we provide evidence on market discipline based on peer-monitoring for the unsecured interbank market, in which riskier counterparts are consistently charged with higher prices for their liquidity.
The EWIS can be used for regulators to monitor the behavior of the participants of the money market. The main policy recommendation of this paper is that financial institutions with a significant amount of EWI should be more carefully monitored by the supervisors, and eventually asked to reduce their overall level of risk.
A more comprehensive model to understand the determinants of the spreads over the market rates of the interbank market is needed. We find some evidence supporting that the net position in the interbank market and the risk of insolvency are important institutionspecific characteristics associated with a growing share of signals (i.e. high and recurrent liquidity prices). However, there are other relevant characteristics such as size, credit risk, aggregated money market liquidity position, and lending relationships, among others that influence the price of liquidity in the interbank market. In addition, market characteristics such as money market rates, the central bank liquidity and the structure of the network are also key determinants to account for.
Furthermore, it is not only important to develop a more extensive framework in order to incorporate these characteristics, but also using both unsecured and secured money market prices. This is important because recent evidence suggests that market discipline prevails regardless of the use of collateral in the secured money market. For instance, based on data for the U.S. secured market, King (2008) and Gorton and Metrick (2012) find that secured borrowing costs also exhibit cross-section differences that are related to counterparty risk. For the Colombian case, Martínez and León (2015) find that borrowing costs vary across financial institutions despite they all use rather homogeneous and low credit risk collaterals (i.e. sovereign's local securities denominated in local currency).
Finally, we stress the relevance of promoting market discipline to enhance monitoring among financial institutions. As envisaged by Plosser (2014) and Yellen (2015) , promoting market discipline is a key goal for policy makers around the globe to safeguard financial stability.
